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ONE "REALIST'S" VIEW OF NATURAL LAW FOR
JUDGES
Even if sometimes bewildered by technical detail, plagued
by woodenness of administration, or outraged by cynical
lawyer's trading on the fact that a given matter turns "not
on justice, but on law," no man can wrestle long with the
things of law without becoming aware that under the very
things which sometimes bewilder, plague or outrage him
there pulses an urge for right, or decency, or justice: a drive
toward an ideal attribute which men may well conceive as a
proper and indeed the proper ultimate objective of all law
and of all legal institutions. The concept of Natural Law
seems to me an expression of this urge: an expression in-
formed by the urge, and directed to its greater realization;
yet an expression only partially effective, because baffled in
part as it moves toward realization, baffled by the very legal
technique which its objective is to criticize and remedy.
In saying this I am conscious of departing from one solid
tradition in regard to the use of the term. "Natural Law"
has been used as the designation of a body of principle for
the right ordering of any human society; principle which for
that reason is so broad as to require perplexing labor to give
it any application concrete enough to give service in prac-
tical legal work. To me principle as broad as that appears
to be not a lawyer's Natural Law, nor Natural Law in
a lawyer's sense. A lawyer, .or indeed a jurist, has as one
major function the dealing with detailed principle and rule
applicable to a given going society, in terms accurate enough
to let any relevant particular persons or groups know where
they stand. A lawyer's Natural Law is an effort to bring the
philosopher's Natural Law to bear in lawyerlike actual reg-
ulation of the multiple specific problems of human conflict.
There is even another tradition in regard to the use of the
term, Natural Law: a tradition of which some of Grotius'
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writings and some of Mansfield's decisions may remind; a
tradition in which Natural Law is conceived as .a body of
applicable rules. I have no desire to choose between the two
traditions, which are indeed wholly consonant with each
other. I do suggest, however that Natural Law in the phil-
osopher's sense bears on the work of the normal legal scholar
who is concerned with Natural Law as a keystone and as a
touchstone for his own labors, while it leaves those actual
labors still to be done. The labors themselves must be con-
cerned in good part with'the formulation, detail by detail, of
apposite rules, for the particular legal scholar's own society
rules which are consistent with, and perhaps crowned by,
the philosopher's Natural Law. But few of those rules will
be dictated by the philosopher's Natural Law. Their purposes
may often be, but rarely if ever their form. Whereas matters
of legal form are for the lawyer matters of his very substance.
I shall speak of such legal scholar, in this aspect of his
distinctively legal work, as a Natural Lawyer; and it is his
rules for his society which this paper is dealing with under
the designation Natural Law.
In one important aspect it is convenient to conceive Law
as made up of rules and normative concepts; broad rules
(commonly spoken .of as "principles") and more precise ones
(commonly spoken of as "rules"); ideal terms of dynamic
normative character, both relatively precise ("concepts" -
if this is what Pound, say, means by "concepts") and rela-
tively vague ("standards"). Insofar, Law is conceived as
something which can and does envisage its own occasional
disregard by layman or by lawman, and which can and does
nonetheless hold, and hold valid. The breach of duty pro-
duces the enforcement, the error produces the reversal. The
formulated rules, and those semi-formulated rules which are
felt rather than stated, remain as guides to conduct initially,
and as guides for the correction or rebuke of aberrant con-
duct which occurs. They remain also as material to be sub-
jected to critique in the light of the objectives of all law, and,
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one hopes, to be slowly themselves corrected and readjusted
in the direction of more adequately reflecting justice.
It is at this point, as I see it, that the lawyer's Natural Law
enters the picture. His Natural Law bears a relation to posi-
tive law (positive law viewed as a body of actually prevail-
ing rules and concepts) which is curiously similar to the re-
lation of such positive law to actually prevailing human
behavior. Discrepancies in positive law do not affect- the
validity or virtue of the Natural Law; it continues, despite
all such discrepancy; it affords a concrete guide to the mak-
ing of proper positive law, and a concrete guide for the cor-
rection of positive law which has gotten itself badly and
aberrantly made.
This does not exhaust the similarity. There is another
phase, and one which is crucial both to the effectiveness and
to the limits of utility of the lawyer's Natural Law concep-
tion. That phase is that Natural Law meets positive law (as
positive law meets particular behavior) within the case-law
judge's realm of thinking and discourse. The lawyer's or
jurist's Natural Law is properly formulated in rules, in nor-
mative propositions attaching prescribed legal consequences
to described types of possible fact. They claim, these rules
of Natural Law, to be right rules, true rules, the right and
true rules, the only right and true rules, the only right and
true rules of law. At every step in the judging process they
sit at the judge's side, and counsel steadily that all leeway
properly entrusted to case-law judges be utilized to correct
any incorrect positive rule-formulation so that it may more
closely fit the correct rule-formulation: It is the aim and
function of such Natural Law to be thus drawn upon con-
tinually as a source of positive law; and this ought to hold
no less as to the reading ("interpretation," "construction,"
"application") or development of statute law than it does in
regard to the continuing reformulation of case-law rule and
principle.
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This same characteristic accounts for what seems to me
an inherent limitation upon such Natural Law. Conceived
as Law, it must undertake the ordering of a society. Con-
ceived as a guide to positive law, it must deal with the or-
dering of a society not too greatly dissimilar from the society
whose positive law it is to guide. Such a society, as giv-
en by history, is always a society which has had to compro-
mise with much which is plain injustice, if justice be viewed
as at all determined by the good, as distinct from the neces-
sary. Views will differ about where such injustice is found;
but views can hardly differ about the presence of injustice,
and of injustice compromised with. And natural lawyers
have, it seems to me, whenever they have dealt with a giv-
en social structure, found themselves with some regularity
doing similar compromise. They have allowed themselves in-
deed materially greater leeway in working toward their
view of justice, than have purely "positive" lawyers; but
from compromising they have not escaped.
As indicated, this seems to me altogether proper. Guidance
for a particular society must plant its feet in that society.
And guidance for a positive legal scheme must rub elbows
with that scheme, or grow chimerical.
The above views on Natural Law seem to lead to a num-
ber of conclusions which will doubtless be subject to even
sharper challenge than the views themselves. The first is that
most of a jurist's or lawyer's Natural Law will in a diversi-
fied World fail of its very function if its content be sought
in formulations so broad as to apply to too many legal times,
systems and societies at once. Its very virtue lies in concret-
ization so great as to invite its infiltration into a particular
given body of positive law - its infiltration in terms not only
of large guidance, but of detailed rule. That other type of
"natural law" study to which Wigmore's The Pledge Idea
is a monument - the search for inherent coincidence at all
times of certain conditions with certain types of legal in-
stitution, or of inherent sequences in all places in the devel-
ONE "REALIST'S ' VIEW OF NkTURAL LAW
opment of certain types of legal institution - that is a study
looking for "natural law" in the sense of sociological sequence
of effect upon cause. It sheds lights on the right only insofar
as it sheds light upon the necessary, and again only insofar
as the necessary conditions the right. Natural Law in the
more proper sense has Natural character in that different
sense in which Natural means "conforming to ideal essence."
The second conclusion is that Natural Law has a peculiar-
ly fertile field wherever the precepts and concepts of positive
law are malleable, are not caught into unchangeable author-
itative words, and are subjected by the going tradition itself
to constant reexamination and reformulation. It is thus pecu-
liarly at home, it is indeed peculiarly needed, in a case-law
system; for a case-law system places responsibility for day to
day reformulation of rule and principle upon the bench. In
a case-law system the verbal garb of rules is not fixed, and
rephrasing to constantly and more closely approach a righter
phrasing is not only proper, but is a bounden duty of scholar
and of judge.
In such a system the Natural Law of a lawyer is, again,
peculiarly at home, and is peculiarly needed, at a period
when stress of change and circumstance in the surrounding
society is forcing upon the particular body of case-law not
only a fuller utilization, but a fuller conscious utilization,
of that flexibility which is inherent in any case-law system.
Reformulation for the future, but upon the past, has been
the pride of our case-law through the centuries; and the extra
touch of emphasis upon the future which was the life of
.American case-law a century ago has for two decades been
with us again. No wonder, then, that we find Natural Law
in vigorous revival here today.
The third conclusion is that it should occasion mild won-
derment to find any Natural Law man and any so-called
realist engaged in pegging brickbats at each other. Each sees
the positive rules and concepts of here and now as present
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and potent. Each regards them as requiring reexamination in
terms of their effective going value. Each sees one major
guide to their evaluation in the service which they prove on
examination either to render or not to render to the society
which brought them forth. Each labors for the utilization
of the greater leeways afforded by legislation, and the lesser
leeways afforded by that case-law system which is built out
of the rulings of a nation, to produce a finer and more ef-
fective set of guides for conduct and for judging. And it is
difficult for me to conceive of the ultimate legal ideals of any
of the writers who have been called realists in terms which
do not resemble amazingly the type and even the content of
the principles of a philosopher's Natural Law.
Finally, it is my belief that the working methods pro-
pounded, and followed in actual work, by writers who profess
various jurisprudential faiths which have come into labels,
and labels which seem to have become rather more combative
than descriptive - it is my belief that the working methods
of these differently labelled writers form an interesting and
highly useful complement to one anothet. At any rate, this
"realist" welcomes the modern Natural Law movement -
including those parts of it which he doubtless does not yet
understand. Nor does he feel at all backward in urging upon
workers in that movement that the so-called realists have
been getting the rust off quite a number of ancient and rather
admirable legal tools, which any worker in law would do
well to look over and even install over his own work-bench.
Such a distinction as that between Philosopher's and Law-
yer's Natural Law, for example: it is so old, so obvious, so
useful - and in these latter days so rusted in neglect.
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